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Consumers and Antitrust Treble Damages:
Credit-Furniture Tie-ins in the Low Income
Market
-by John Ladd
Any person who shall be damaged in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
for.., and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
-Section 4, Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
I predict... that not one suit will ever be brought under this ...
section by any person who is simply damaged in his character as
a consumer ....
-Senator George, 21 CONG. RIc. 3150, April 8, 1890.
Despite the apparent utility of Section 4 of the Clayton Act to protect
and compensate private citizens,1 damage suits by or on behalf of
citizens qua consumers have been rare.2 Commentators in the areas of
1. See pp. 278-83 infra.
2. See p. 278 infra. The reasons for this neglect are fairly clear. The predic-
tion of Senator George, supra, was apparently based on the probability that the expense
of an action to recover a small sum would be prohibitive, and on the restrictive law In
1890 applying to class actions. See 21 CONG. REc. 3150 (1890); M. FoRoscil, ANTIxusr AND
THE CONSUMER (ENFORCEMENT) 128 (1965). Treble damage litigation is long and expensive,
and the amount of recovery by individual consumers is likely to be slight. Until recently
consumers have not been organized sufficiently to bring class actions. Generally, people
who see themselves more as consumers than as entrepreneurs do not conceive of law as
a tool to be used offensively, and even poverty lawyers seem loath to bring actions as
plaintiffs. Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 765 and authorities
cited in n.128 (1967). The pattern of federal enforcement seems to reflect a priority
given to regulating conduct among businessmen rather than conduct between business.
man and consumer, with the result that most federal prosecutions are brought against
manufacturers rather than retailers. This in turn facilitates private suits by businessmen
rather than by consumers.
Foutosca 328 suggested a theory that states could sue as parens patrie. States have
been aggressive in suing to recover damages based on their own purchases. Scc, c.g.,
Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 55 (D. Minn. 1966) (consolidated suits by
seven states for treble damages for enhanced price of rock salt purchased for road
de-icing). One parens patrie suit has been brought by Hawaii, claiming damages from
price fixing of gasoline. The federal district court denied a motion to dismiss a parens
patrie count, but dismissed a class action without opinion. Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
is planned. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 5 TRADE REC. REP. 72,916 (D. Hawai,
July 2, 1969); Letter from Deputy Atty. Gen'l of Hawaii to the Yale Law journal,
June 2, 1969, on file at the Yale Law Journal. Cf. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 24 U.S.
489 (1945).
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antitrust and consumer protection have failed to explore the oppor-
tunities for such actions.3 This Note will consider a dimension of the
use of antitrust treble damage actions as a consumer remedy and will
explore the application of antitrust doctrine to certain tie-ins in con-
sumer sales.
Consumers are frequently faced with sales of one product (the tying
product) conditioned upon the purchase of another (the tied product).4
In a common form of tying arrangement, a low-income market (LIM)
retailer will extend long-term credit only if the consumer uses it to
buy consumer durables from the retailer; under the special conditions
of the low-income market, the retailer can then shift part of the cost
of the credit to his stated price for furniture (or other consumer
durable) to make his credit appear "cheap."5
For example, a recent F.T.C. study of Washington, D.C., found that
general market retailers gave credit to good credit risks at 21%, and
sold furniture wholesaling for $100 at $159 retail. Credit sales com-
prised 27% of the total. In contrast, LIM retailers gave credit to vir-
tually any consumer at 24%, and sold furniture wholesaling at $100
for $255 retail. Credit was extended in ninety-three per cent of their
sales. The minimal increase in credit price for the incurring of sub-
stantial extra risk, coupled with the sharply inflated furniture price,
led the F.T.C. to conclude that charge shifting had occurred.6 Com-
3. E.g., E. TMAEaLCxx, FEDmAL Tm LE DAirAGo An'Rusr Acno:¢s (1965); NEw Yore
STATE BAR ASS'N, 1967 ANrnusr LAw SYMpoSIuM (extensive discussion of antitrust and
consumer protection without considering suits by consumers); Note, Consumer Legisla-
tion and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
4. A complaint claiming illegality of a contract tying food to a patented freezer
was filed in a recent New York case, but bankruptcy of the seller prcvented judgment
on the merits. Hayden v. Cohen, Index No. 2552/63 (N.Y. Sup. CL, N.Y. Co., Filed
Dec. 5, 1967), noted N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1968, at 2, Col. 2; 12 War. L. BULL. 15 (April, 1963),
16 VLF. L. BuL. 21 (March, 1969); for the complaint, see C. KAz, Tim LAw ANo TuE
Low INcoEm CONSUMER 944, 348-49 (1968). A current promotion in New York City
involves the tie-in of a "free" stereo to weekly purchases of overpriced records. The total
price was one-third higher than the estimated market price of the components. "Rooms"
of furniture may also be sold at a unit price, without itemization, allowing the seller to
avoid effective recissions for defects in individual pieces. Karpel, Ghetto Fraud on the
Installment Plan, NrV YORK, May 26, 1969, at 26, 27, 29-31, and June 2, 1969, at 41
[hereinafter cited as Ghetto Fraud I and I1]. Several writers have discussed and generally
dismissed the problem of consumer tie-ins. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 50, 73-74 (1958); Baldwin & McFarland,
Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANrrrlusT BuLL. 743, 776-77 (1963). See
also note 105 infra.
5. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), gives
this question current interest. The Court held that a cause of action was stated where the
defendant, U.S. Steel, had given attractive financing to plaintiff real estate developer
on the condition that a large portion of the funds be used to purchase US. Steel's
prefabricated homes. The majority and dissenting opinions all left open the possibility
that some retailer credit transactions may be illegal. S94 U.S. at 507, 515-16, 523.
6. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EcoNoMIc REPORT ON INSrTALLI-.'N AD RErAIL SALES
PRAcrtCES OF DimsCr OF COLumm, RErALmERs ix-x, xii-xii (1968) [hereinafter cited
255
The Yale Law Journal
mentators have observed this same practice in other low-income mar-
kets.T
I.
The following hypothetical is designed to show how a LIM retailer
might discover that shifting charges would allow him to increase his
price without loss of demand. At time A, a cash-only merchant who
sells a given item at $190 in the low-income market decides to begin
extending credit. He offers a one-year installment contract to anyone
who purchases furniture from him, but does not make loans to non-
purchasers. Keeping his furniture price at $190 because he still wishes
to compete on cash sales, he prices his standard loan at $35, which he
estimates to be the market value of credit to his high risk customers.
Since he deals almost exclusively with the poor, he soon finds that the
great majority of his sales are on the installment plan. At time B, per-
haps to avoid either credit disclosure, usury lawss or customer resent-
ment of obviously high interest rates, he decides to decrease the price
of credit and increase that of furniture. The LIM retailer still receives
a total of $225 for his combined products, but now sets the "credit
price" at $22 and the "furniture price" at $203. Perhaps unexpectedly,
he finds that the new pricing arrangement has increased his sales beyond
their normal level. At time C therefore, he increases his total price to a
combined $240. He finds that he can now maintain his accustomed
as F.T.C.]. One welfare recipient supporting a family of nine on an income of $194
a month was sold a $308.95 television and extended credit at $40 per month. F.T.C, at 49.
Table IV-14. The average LIM customer had 4.3 family members and a monthly income
of $348, as compared to the Bureau of Labor Statistics "moderate" standard of living
for a family of four of $730 and a median D.C. family income of almost $500. F.T.C.
at x, 39. Bad-debt losses for the low-income market retailers were 20 times those of
general market retailers. F.T.C. at 18, Table 11-5. The District of Columbia laws relating
to loans and retail credit do not vary significantly from those of most states in such a
way as to suggest that the D.C. practice is unusual. The District apparently had no credit
disclosure laws at the time of the study. See I CCH CONSUMEt CrIT GUIDE (D.C.) (1969).
The F.T.C. study does not reveal the retailers' practices regarding disclosure of credit
rates. Similar mark-ups of goods tied to high-risk credit seem to occur in other products.
See In re Leon A. Tashof, Docket No. 8714 (F.T.C., Dec. 2, 1968) (on file at the Yale Law
Journal) (eyeglasses); F.T.C. at 9 (clothing, jewelry, service markets).
7. Note 16 infra; Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 756
& authorities cited in n.61 (1967) (regarding high product prices); Ghetto Fraud 1, supra
note 4, at 27; Interviews with New Haven and Bridgeport, Conn., Legal Services attorneys,
and with Mr. Craig Karpel, author of Ghetto Fraud.
8. See Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397,
1458-59 (1967). Usury laws do not wholly explain the practice of charge shifting which
occurs in jurisdictions without usury laws that apply to retailers. Charge shifting In
response to truth-in-lending tends to support the explanation of the practice in terms
of consumer irrationality. See p. 258 infra. In any case, the mere fact that the tying
seller had other motives than to take advantage of irrationality or that the practice has
other effects does not necessarily mean that the tie-in is legal. See p. 270 infra.
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volume at prices higher than those charged before shifting his pricing
arrangement. These events are summarized in the following table:
Time A B C
Furniture price 190 203 215
Credit charge 35 22 25
Interest rate9  32% 20% 21%
Total price 225 225 .40
Volume X X+Y X
Of course the real price to the consumer of a given piece of furniture
bought simultaneously with a given term of credit is the total price of
the whole transaction. 10 Demand should not be affected by the alloca-
tion of the total between the component products, i.e., by the apparent
interest rate. Thus an increase in demand as a result of charge shifting
must be the result of economically "irrational" behavior by con-
sumers."1 On the basis of intuition and existing empiric data, low-
income consumers in the credit-furniture market appear for several
reasons to behave irrationally when confronted with the shifting of
charges: the tie-in is therefore immediately profitable for the retailer
and harmful for the purchaser.
First, despite the theoretical irrelevance of stated interest rate to his
decision, the consumer is likely to be influenced by it nonetheless, and
to avoid purchases which seem to involve high stated credit charges.'-
This may occur because high rates violate conventional notions of a
"fair price" for credit.' 3 Where the buyer is an especially poor credit
risk his tendency to look to separate charges rather than the package
will be accentuated by the unavailability to him of any "package" price
9. Approximate. Computed by the "actuarial method" from the Dep't. of Defense
table reproduced at I CCH CONSUMER Cumrr GUIDE 3734 (1969).
10. See F. JusTER & R. SHAY, CONSU.tIE Sasmivrr To FiNANcE RATES: ArN Em tsrJCa.A
AND ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 98-105 (1964). Interest rates are superfluous to comparisons
of the cost of credit among retailers, because in each case furniture will probably be
tied to credit offered over the same term. Id. at 1-2. Accurate interest rate comparisons
are necessary, of course, for comparison with untied sources of credit. See p. -270 infra.
11. Exploitation of irrationality, or, what is the same thing, the concealment of
information, can be a deliberate tactic to achieve a number of goals prohibited by the
Sherman Act. Compare Small Co. v. Lanborn & Co., 267 US. 248 (1925), with Record at
9, 29-30, id. (price-fixing by group-created illusion of shortage of supply). Cf. United States
v. National Retail Credit Assn, 1953 TaADE CAs. 67,608, at 6,920 (E.D. Mo. 1953);
United States v. Savannah Cotton & Naval Stores Exchange, Inc., 1950-51 TI=DE CAs.
62,929, at 68,844 (S.D. Ga. 1951). For a theoretical analysis of buyer irrationality,
see Ozga, Imperfect Markets Through Lack of Knowledge, 74 QuARTErnLy J. or EcoN.
29 (1960).
12. JusTEE & SHAY, supra note 10, at 4, 64-75. When consumers were asked to react
to contracts with stated interest rates over 16%, they tended to say that they would not
buy under such contracts.
13. See testimony of former Senator Paul Douglas, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90 Cong.,
1st Sess., 37, 38-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Lending Hearings].
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without price shifting; since general market retailers do not extend
high-risk credit, the low-income purchaser will be forced to compare
the charge-shifted package of the low-income market retailer with the
separate prices of the small loan company and the general furniture
retailer. Unless he has an especially analytic mind, he is as likely to
compare the separate united prices with each arbitrary component of
the LIM price as he is to add together the untied prices and to compare
the packages.14
Second, whenever consumers do look to the elements of the package
price, they are likely to be more responsive to a shift in credit price
(e.g., from $35 to $22), than to a compensatory shift in furniture price
(e.g., from $190 to $203). Recent truth-in-lending legislation seems to
have altered the former insensitivity of consumers to interest rates.16
Perhaps the best evidence of this new responsiveness is that sellers
have in fact reacted to disclosure requirements with charge shifts,10
and that charge-shifting occurs in jurisdictions where no usury laws
apply to retailersY' Greater sensitivity to credit than to furniture prices
may be a result of the lack of quality differences in credit as opposed
to the consumer durables with which it is sold.18 The consumer may
well have a general idea of current credit prices, but no idea of the
14. Indeed, many U.S. Congressmen seemed to be unclear at the time of the truth-in.
lending act as to when credit rate and when total price was the relevant variable for
purchasing decisions. See H.R. RE. No. 1040, 1968[2] U.S. Coax: CONG. AND ADbmN,
NEws 1962, 1963.
15. The studies establishing unresponsiveness to credit charge variations were based
on undisclosed interest rates and transactions involving only package price. See Jvrrat
& SHAY, supra note 10, at 28, n. 29. Many commentators suggested disclosure as a meang
of increasing consumer sensitivity. See, e.g., H. BLAcK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 218-24 (1961).
16. Pullen, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Legislation-The Massachusetts Experl-
ence, Research Rept. to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston No. 43, at 49.50 (1968),
reported that LIM retailers responded to Massachusetts disclosure laws by shifting finance
charges into stated cash prices. Paul Rand Dixon noted the possibility that ghetto re-
tailers would respond to truth-in-lending by shifting charges, and correctly predicted that
nothing in the proposed legislation would prevent them from so doing. Hearings on the
F.T.C. Report on Credit Practices Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1968) [hereinafter cited
at FTC Report Hearings]. The reporters for the Uniform Commercial Credit Code recog-
nized this problem as applied to interest ceilings, but the UCCC provides only the
unconscionability doctrine to prevent the gutting of the disclosure requirement by ghetto
retailers. Jordan 8- Warren, The Uniform Commercial Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
387, 393-94 (1968); UCCC § 6.111(3)(c) & comment 3 (Rev. Final Draft 1968). See generally
Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N,Y.U.L. REv. 1, 7.8, 13-14
(1969). As Kripke points out, the disclosure-charge shift problem Is one that is difficult
to solve. The unconsdionability solution is likely to reach only extreme abuses, and regula-
tion of prices of durables poses an unacceptable administrative burden. Id. at 7. See also
Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 298, 326 (1969).
17. The site of the F.T.C. study (Washington, D.C.) has no such laws. See 1 CCH
CoNsummt CeEDiT GUmE section on District of Columbia.
18. See JuSTER & SHAY, supra note 10, at 48.
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price of stoves of varied levels of quality.19 Even if he comparison shops
and finds variations in credit charges, the consumer may be unable to
tell whether furniture price differentials are explained by quality or
brand differences between different stores.20 He is likely to prefer a
store that he "knows" has lower credit charges over one that may have
better savings on furniture.2'
Third, the shifting of charges makes a number of consumer decisions
more difficult, and thus creates confusion which high-pressure sales
techniques can turn to the seller's advantage.2 Since he is confronted
with a purely arbitrary "interest rate," it may be almost impossible for
the consumer to decide whether he should purchase goods on credit
or defer purchase until he has cash. He will also have difficulty de-
ciding whether to buy the combined products from the tying market
or to take a loan from a finance agency and purchase furniture in the
general market. 3
19. The knowledge of the consumer is frequently based on the shared experiences of
other consumers. In this way he had, before disclosure laws, an "institutional" knowledge
of what types of credit were more expensive than others. See Jusrx 9- StAY, jupra
note 10, at 56-62. If this pattern of shared information continues under the disclosure
laws, the consumer would be likely to know prices of an homogeneous commodity used
by nearly all of his neighbors. See note 10 infra.
20. See Hearings on S. 985 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong,
Ist Sess., ser. 89-28, at 566-68 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Senate Padaging Hearings].
Indeed, buyers may even take the LIM retailer's higher price as an Indication of its
quality. IV. BAUMOL, EcoNoMIc THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 170 (1965).
21. Much of the testimony on the federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1451-61 (Supp. IV, 1965-68), concerned the practice of "concealed inflation" by which the
manufacturer held price and box frontal size constant while decreasing the less noticeable
net content of the box. See, e.g., Senate Packaging Hearings, supra note 20, at 675-76;
Hearings on H.R. 15440 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-44, Part I, at 44, 237-38 (1966 [hereinafter cited as House
Packaging Hearings]. This practice, like the pricing shift, is a particular case of teller's
propensity to use interdependent pricing factors in such a way as to conceal pricing
increases. Elimination of the tie-in, like the standardization of containers, would remove
an interdependency likely to harm consumers.
22. See testimony of Mrs. Betty Furness, Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Ses.,
Part I, at 88 [hereinafter cited as House Lending Hearings].
23. Such confusion prevents the consumer from fulfilling his economic role of al-
locating productive resources and defeats the disclosure philosophy behind the Truth-in-
Lending and Fair Packaging and Labeling laws. The statement of Paul Rand Dixon
dearly applies to credit as well as goods choices. "Our competitive economy to be effective
proceeds on the assumption that consumers have [information for intelligent comparisons
between competing products], so that they can maximize their satisfactions by purchasing
those goods and services which most nearly meet their needs or desires . . .. Surely it
would not be asking too much to suggest that the label disclose accurately ... the price
in terms which are understandable to the consumer .... They should not be lured
by . . . combination offers.' Senate Packaging Hearings, supra note 20, at 79. See also
testimony of Senator Hart, sponsor of the Packaging Bill, Senate Packaging Hearings
719; of Sec'y of Commerce Barr, House Lending Hearings, supra note 22, at 75; of
President Johnson, MAESSAE, H.R. Doc. No. 57, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). See also
Section 2 of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1452 (Supp. IV 196.6S);
Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68 YAm L.J. 837,
848-49 (1958).
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II.
Given both a segregated market and the tying arrangement the LIM
retailer is able to allocate his total price arbitrarily between "furniture
price" and "credit price." If he were to sell untied credit the LIM re-
tailer could not lower his stated credit price without having to sell a
great deal of it at a loss. 2 4 The complicated relationship between
market segregation and charge shifting can best be understood through
the theory of circular and cumulative causation.25
Circular cumulative causation in an economic system means that a
number of social factors affecting consumer welfare are interrelated in
such a way that a consumer-detrimental change in factor A induces
consumer-detrimental changes in other factors B, C, and D (cumula-
tion). Where this causation system runs through many factors and
especially where the initial changed factor A will eventually be itself
further changed to be still more consumer-detrimental as a result of
changed B, C, and D (circularity), the economic system will be subject
to large fluctuations occurring from an initially small impetus. The
classic illustration is Gunnar Myrdal's study of Blacks in America.20
White racism causes inequality of opportunity, which in turn causes
economic and educational deprivation (cumulative). The resulting in-
capacity feeds the myth of natural inferiority, which in turn increases
racist practices (circular).27
The importance of the principle of cumulative and circular causa-
tion is that it belies the validity of the fundamental assertion of neo-
classical economic analysis that economic systems tend to stable
equilibria in which resources and rewards are almost always ration-
ally distributed. Appreciation of the principle leads to the under-
standing that an unregulated market can produce swings affecting
24. The assumption is made here that for a buyer of a given credit risk the LIM
merchant's untied credit ("loan") price would have to be quite similar to his tied
credit price. To state the prices differently would tend to reveal his charge shifting. He
may, of course, have additional reasons (such as the difficulty of obtaining a small loan
license) for the tie-in other than to facilitate charge shifting.
25. The general theory of circular and cumulative causation is developed in G. MYVDAL,
AN AmERICAN DI.EMMA 75-78, 1065-70 (20th anniv. ed. 1962); G. MYRWAL, EcoNobIla
THEORY AND THE UNDER-DEVELOPED REGIONS 3-49 (1947).
26. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERicAN DILEMMA (20th anniv. ed. 1962).
27. Many abusive practices in the low-income durables market represent instances of
circular and cumulative causation-they arise and flourish because of segregation and In
turn reinforce the segregation which engendered them. The existence of abuses keepi
middle class consumers away, and discourages general market retailers from competing
for the purchases of the poor. Increased market segregation in turn makes existing
abuses more profitable and creates opportunities for the invention of new abuses. Segre.
gation and abuses together make poor consumers poorer; greater poverty makes it even
more difficult to combat abuses, and so fosters segregation. And so on.
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consumer welfare which have no tendency to correct themselves in the
absence of deliberate outside intervention. Likewise, individuals or
social classes who are initially in a position of substantial economic
equality with other individuals or classes may move quickly to a
disastrous inequality caused by a seemingly minor impetus.2 8
The effects of market segregation on the welfare of poor consumers
can be considered under two headings: exclusion of middle class con-
sumers and "capture" of low-income consumers.20 The exclusionary
aspect of the low-income market raises what might be called the
"consumer defense" aspect of segregation. Consumer knowledge and
consumer protection are group efforts,30 and the poor as a group lack
the sophistication and resources which permit middle class buyers to
enforce reasonable standards of honesty in the general market.31 As a
result, when the poor buy in a segregated market they are particularly
likely to fall prey to the whole gamut of retailer abuses. In the absence
of middle class buyers, -32 low-income market sellers are free to engage
in bait-and-shift advertising; sandbagging; turnovers; delivery of in-
ferior, damaged, or used furniture; failure to repair; dishonor of war-
ranties; strong-arm collection techniques; sewer service; and the use
of garnishment as a nearly automatic collection device.33 The absence
of middle class consumers also perpetuates abusive charge shifting.
The deceptiveness and the mathematical nature of the practice makes
absence of middle class sophistication particularly harmful. The sub-
stantial exclusion of middle class cash buyers is also, of course, a
28. Cumulative causation does not imply that a social system need progressively
worsen. Just as the interrelationships of factors within the system cause change for the
worse to accelerate, even a slight change for the better is likewise self-incrmenting.
Beneficial cumulative changes may succeed in overcoming cumulative adverse change.
29. The market is of course not totally segregated. Not all of the poor shop in the
low-income market. But it can be safely said that there is a market patronized by a
substantial number of the poor but by almost no middle-class buyers. See F.T.C., jupra
note 6, at 39, Table IV-5. Of the 486 LIM customers surve)e in the F.T.C. study, only
35 had incomes over $8,000 and only 9 over $10,000. Only 31 lived in a house which they
owned or were purchasing. Only 8 of 549 customers were professionals or technical
workers, proprietors or managers. F.T.C. at 58-42.
30. Consumers tend to have accurage notions of broad propositions, such as that
ghetto merchants have high furniture prices, or the general ranking of credit prices
among various types of institutions; yet most of them are incapable in a given specific
instance to compute even such a simple matter as an interest rate. cf. H. 13LAcx,
BuY Now, PAY LATER 135 (1961); JusrER & SHAY, supra note 10, at 56-62; note 19 supra.
31. See Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 745-67 (1907).
32. Cf. F.T.C., supra note 6, at 18, table 11-5. See also Note, Consumer Legislation
and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967); Statement by Dr. David Caplovitz, House Lending
Hearings, supra note 22, Part Ir, at 664-65. The few middle-class buyers who do enter
the low-income market seem likely to be extremely unsophisticated ones, given the higher
prices charged there.
33. Ghetto Fraud I and II, supra note 4.
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prerequisite to charge shifting. A seller with a large proportion of cash
buyers could not overprice furniture without a loss of cash sales.
The second aspect of segregation, the "capture" of the poor, also
has negative effects on consumer welfare, since it makes possible a form
of price discrimination. 4 Whenever a seller can isolate a group of
buyers with more steeply sloped demand curves8" he can charge those
buyers a higher price than other buyers. The buyers in the low-income
market will make purchases at the higher price according to their de.
mand curve, though only to the extent that the increased price does not
cause them to escape to the general market. It seems likely that low-
income consumers do have steeper demand curves than average con.
sumers. As compared with the average consumer, a high proportion
of durables purchased by the poor are not easily foregone or deferred.
Purchases of cost-saving appliances (kitchen equipment, washing ma.
chines, televisions) by the poor are more likely to be initial pur.
chases, or replacements of totally inoperative old appliances, rather
than replacements of merely outmoded equipment; thus, the value to
the poor consumer of substituting home for commercial washing is
likely to be higher than the value to the more wealthy consumer of
substituting a 1969 washer for a 1960 model.8 0 The low-income con.
sumer's lack of sophistication and lesser propensity to comparison shop
also insure a steeper demand curve for the products of the LIM re-
tailer.3 Through the tie-in and charge shifting, the low-income market
retailer thus achieves much the same effect as the classic price dis-
criminator, who segregates buyers with different demand curves and
34. For an account of price discrimination, see G. STIGLER, TnE TuvRaov 0r Psucr
209-14 (3d ed. 1966).
35. I.e., those buyers who with a given increase in price decrease purchases less than
other buyers.
36. "The demand for durable goods is implicitly a demand for their services." Even
if the value of the services of an old machine is less than that of a new one, any positive
value of the old machine represents a deduction from the desire for a new one. See
STIGLE, supra note 34, at 29-31.
37. The theory in the text is somewhat simplified for the general reader. Segregation
and differing individual demand curves are central to price discrimination. The other
elements are also present here. A limited number of LIM retailers, product differ-
entiation and failure to comparison shop will ensure that a portion of the greater slope
of individual demand curves will be passed on as a sloped firm demand curve. See
STrGLER, supra note 34, at 42, 90, 340, 342; Note, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tic.In
Doctrine alter Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YAL L.. 86, 94 (10969) [hereinafter dted is
Tie-in Doctrine]. The requirement that buyers in the less steep portion do not resell to
those in the steeper is undoubtedly met here. Since induced consumer irrationality keeps
the poor from the general market, it even more surely keeps them from buying from the
middle-class. See pp. 258-59 supra. It is true that discrimination effects become lees
serious as there are multiple sellers within the low-income market, but this factor does
not totally eliminate the effects. See STcLt 90.
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then sells to both groups, charging higher prices to those with steeper
demand curves and lower prices to those with less steep curves.
The LIM retailer's ability to raise prices above the general market
level-the result of the poor consumer's difficulties in entering the
general market-can be converted into the ability to impose condi-
tions which consumers regard as abusive.33 This may be illustrated by
considering how "capture" facilitates charge shifting. Consider the
low-income buyer who recognizes some aspect of the harm caused by
charge shifting-he realizes that the LIM retailer has high furniture
prices and uses various deceptive practices. 0 Because of his high need
for the durable he will not forego purchase entirely. His only effective
defense-to use the general rather than the LIM retailer-will be pre-
cluded as long as he perceives the cost of transfering to the general
market (e.g., costs in terms of transportation; suffering of class, racial
or cultural prejudice; unavailability of credit40) as higher than the
detriments imposed by the LIM retailer. When he then goes back to
the low-income market store, the consumer may be determined not to
be gulled, but in the face of shifted charges and high pressure sales
techniques, this determination is likely to be a much less effective de-
fense than staying away entirely.41 The customer's wariness itself may
increase his vulnerability by leading him to check carefully the interest
rate or to jump at minor price reductions.4
It should be noted that in the above analysis, market segregation is
a continuous, not a quantum, phenomenon. The more complete the
segregation, the fewer middle-class resources are brought to bear in
discovering and combatting retailer abuses and the steeper the firm
demand curve and the higher the price to the group bearing the brunt
of price discrimination.4 3 The perceived costs of entering the general
market define how much perceived deviation from general market
norms the low income consumer will accept in the low-income market
-deviation in the form of higher prices, low quality, bad service,
deception and offensive collection techniques.
88. See Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 91.
39. Many customers seem to have some knowledge that the durables prices of LII
retailers are high. See sources cited note 90 supra.
40. See Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 749-64 (1967).
41. See testimony of Mrs. Betty Furness, House Lending Hearings, supra note 22,
at 88.
42. See GBarro FRAtu I, supra note 4, at 24-25. See also note 20 supra.
43. See STGEER, supra note 34, at 42, 340.
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III.
Segregation, then, is necessary for the initiation of charge shifting;44
it also has a cumulative effect on consumer-detrimental aspects of the
low-income market, including a further intensification of the irration-
ality induced by charge shifting.4r Analysis of cumulative and circular
causation in the low-income market will be completed upon a showing
that charge shifting in turn intensifies and perpetuates market segrega-
tion. It is of course not claimed that charge shifting is the only cause
of market segregation. Residential segregation, inadequate public trans-
portation, community bonds, failure to comparison shop and many
other factors may contribute to market segregation. 40 But charge shift-
ing does add to market segregation in ways that may be very important,
even vital, to its maintenance.47
The contribution of charge shifting to the exclusion of middle class
buyers from the low income market is fairly plain. The increase in the
stated furniture price makes cash (and therefore middle class) pur-
chases from the LIM retailer unlikely. Though the LIM retailer
might agree to lower his furniture price to one offering cash, most
middle class customers are unlikely to "haggle" over price.
The contribution of the tie plus charge shift to the other aspect of
segregation-'capture" of the poor consumer by the LIM retailer
and consequent exclusion of general market sellers-is more com-
plicated. Although it could conceivably represent new demand, the
increase in sales at a given price which occurs as a result of charge
shifting presumably is at least in part at the expense of the general
retailer. But more important, the main effect of the charge shift is
that it creates a barrier against entry into the low-income market by
44. P. 261-62 supra.
45. Pp. 261-63 supra.
46. Note 40 supra.
47. Availability of credit may be the central factor in the use of the lowI-ncome
market furniture store. The store is usually far enough away and the purchases bulky
enough to require transportation to and from either class of store. Nor are the furniture
stores such neighborhood operations that familiarity or personal knowledge is a prime
factor in store selection. See J. Chapman, Role of Consumer Finance Companies in a
Credit Economy, in THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 1, 19 (J. Chapman & R. Shay cds.
1967); F.T.C. supra note 6, at xiii; Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALr L.J.
745, 745-54 (1967); Ghetto Fraud I, supra note 4, at 27, 31; Lee, An Analysis of installmnct
Borrowing by Durable Goods Buyers, 30 ECONOMErRICA 770, 776 (1962). The low-Income
market merchants in the F.T.C. study succeeded in capturing "44% of our estimated
total expenditures of low-income households for furniture and appliances," F.T.C.,
supra note 6, at 7. However one defines the class of "the poor," some members of that
class probably shop at general market retailers. But those individuals who do shop with
the ghetto merchant are probably the poorest of the poor and the least sophisticated of a
group of the unsophisticated shoppers, and these individuals are very unlikely to make
use of general market stores.
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the general retailer. The most likely process for such entry would be
as follows: 4 (1) the general market furniture retailer achieves sig-
nificantly lower costs than the LIM retailer;4 (2) such lower costs are
translated into a significant furniture price differential between the
general and the LIM retailer;r0 (3) this furniture price differential is
perceived by the low-income consumer as fully compensating him for
the inconvenience and higher price of obtaining credit from a small
loan company and undergoing the other costs of leaving the specialized
low-income market. The charge-shift reduces the likelihood that this
sequence will occur, since it greatly increases the cost and difficulty
of the third step of convincing the poor consumer that his savings
from going downtown will be sufficiently great as to make the trip
worthwhile.
To any seller, consumer knowledge and rationality involves costs.
Consumer perception of his prices and product is as much a fact of
economic life to him as the distance of his plant from his market or
the price of his raw materials. He will ordinarily pay for substantial
advertising solely to influence these perceptions. Here, however, the
costs of propagandizing the consumer are significantly increased by the
charge-shifting of his LIM competitors. Consider first the problem of
the small loan company-the untied seller of high risk credit. In the
absence of retailer charge-shifting, the small loan company could com-
pete with the credit-furniture merchant merely by showing the con-
sumer that his credit is cheaper than that of the retailer, a fairly simple
message given the undifferentiated nature of the product. But with
48. The general retailer is unlikely to feel that there is any good reason for pro-
viding high risk credit himself in installment sales contracts. The general market credit
that he does give is a business involving administrative costs and the foregoing of im.
mediate return. He is not in the business of providing risk capital, but serving the credit
needs of the low-income customer would require just thaL See F.T.C., supra note 6.
at 18, Table 1/1-5. Furthermore he would have to make considerable changes in at least
two of his departments to enter the high-risk credit business. His collection department
would probably have to learn the distasteful tactics of the collection agency. Frequent
garnishment proceedings and repossession would likely have to be added to the more
subtle means he can use for his general customers. Paul Rand Dixon, F.T.C. Report
Hearings, supra note 16, at 4. Likewise his credit department would have to make
pricing decisions rather than merely accept or reject applications. See J. Zwick, A
Cross-Section Study in Industry Costs and Earnings, in THE CoisumR FiNAce I,,DL'sfm-
55, 63-67 (1. Chapman & R. Shay eds. 1967).
The general retailer might well fear that entering the new high-risk credit business
would jeopardize his existing business. Any publicity given to his new collection methods
and new higher rates might well hurt his image in the eyes of his middle-class customers.
Tie-in law developed partly to protect tied product sellers from being forced into a new
industry. See Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 93. Even if lie wanted to enter this
new industry, he would still face the difficulty of charging rates in excess of those stated
by the charge-shifting retailer.
49. See F.T.C., supra note 6, at 17-20.
50. See p. 255 supra.
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the tie-in, the loan company must convince the consumer that the
clear appearance of cheaper credit is misleading because of inflated
prices on furniture whose actual value is difficult to assess. Further, it
may be that the low-income consumer's idea of a "fair price" for credit
is lower than the economic cost of providing it for him, and that he
will therefore consider the loan company's rate excessive.5' If all credit
bore a stated price commensurate with its economic costs, the con-
sumer's notion of a "fair price" would presumably be revised upward
under the pressure of his desire for consumer durables. But as long as
the tying retailer can keep his stated credit price low, conventional
objections to "usurious" rates block opportunities for those who must
price at or above cost.52
The general market furniture retailer faces a similar problem. In
order to convince the low-income buyer that his furniture is cheaper
than that of the LIM retailer, he must somehow expose the false nature
of his competitors' apparently low credit price. 3 The difficulty of both
the small loan company and the general retailer might be overcome
by their joining forces and presenting a total package (or monthly
payment) price rather than separate elements at two prices. But such
a joint advertising campaign would present special problems and
special costs just because the general retailer and the small loan com-
pany are different enterprises in different locations. Such dose co-
operation would be hampered by state laws limiting the small loan
licensee to a single office located in the city neighborhood which he
serves, away from the general retailers who are likely to be concen-
trated "downtown" or in the suburbs.54
Besides erecting an economic barrier to the reduction of market
segregation, charge shifting in many cities may perpetuate a legal bar-
rier to the use of the general market by the poor. In many states usury
laws effectively prevent small loan companies from servicing those of
51. See pp. 257-58 supra. For a general description of the small loan industry, see
J. CHAPmAN & R. StAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY (1967). It would seem likely
that the LIM retailers in the F.T.C. study were pricing credit below cost. General market
stores charged 21%, while ghetto merchants charged 24%, despite bad.debt losses of 6,7%
of total sales (as opposed to general market losses of .3%).
52. See note 12 supra.
53. Consumers do know that the stated furniture price in the general market is
lower than the LIM price, but are unlikely to be able to know whether the difference
is sufficient to overcome the unavailability or higher cost of credit. See note 30 and sources
cited therein.
54. See B. CUREN , TRNDS IN CONSUMER CaTmr LEGISLATION 16-19 (1965). See generally
CCH CONSUMER Cannrr GUIDE. Because the loan companies and the Ueneral market re-
tailers are also injured by the low-income merchants' tie-in, they might join the suit
as plaintiffs, and cooperate with the consumer group in bringing about compliance to
injunctions and changes in state law where necessary to facilitate relief.
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the poor who present the greatest risk.m5 In many states an even lower
interest maximum prevents the general market retailer from providing
very high risk credit. While such retail credit laws purport to control
the LIM retailer as well, they fail to do so because his charge shifting
conceals the true cost of his credit. G The consumer who is so poor
that he cannot be serviced at legal rates must therefore choose between
the LIM retailer and no credit at all. If the usury laws were stable
and permanent, poor consumers might reasonably regard the charge
shift as beneficial by allowing them to escape what must appear as an
illegitimately paternalistic law. But the history of usury laws reveals
them to be characteristically unstableY' The charge shifting LIM re-
tailer is filling the function of the loan shark, acting as ghetto lender
of last resort. He keeps the abuses inherent in the practice sufficiently
low and wiell concealed to prevent the very reform of the usury laws
which would allow the poor to obtain credit from untied or general
market sources.
Of course any number of retailers might forego sales in the general
market and enter the specialized low-income market by reproducing
the charge shift. Such decisions may in fact serve to drive the long-
range profits of all LIM retailers down to a "competitive" level.cS But
such entry would not prevent charge shifting from causing consumers
to act irrationally by increasing their purchases at a given package
price merely because of a different allocation of stated prices. Free
entry of LIM retailers would merely spread to more sellers the benefits
of the higher price.
IV.
Relevant antitrust doctrine is based on the Supreme Court's notion
that while tie-ins are seldom if ever beneficial or necessary for sellers,
55. See J. Chapman, Role of Consumer Finance Companies in a Credit Economy, in
THE CoNsu-tum FiNAxcE INDusIRY 1, 19 (j. Chapman & R. Shay eds. 197); H. B3Acs,
Buy Now, PAY LATER 212 (1961); Lee, An Analysis of Installment Borrowing by Consumer
Durable Goods Buyers, 30 ECONO mTRCA 770, 776 (1962); note 101 infra.
56. See articles cited supra note 16.
57. As soon as a usury law becomes effective-i.e., where no device such as charge
shifting is available to avoid its effect-illegal sources of high-risk credit arise. These
"loan sharks," uncontrolled by the law and unable to use the courts to enforce collection,
charge such excessive rates and use such violent methods that the political costs of re-
taining the usury level becomes unacceptable; the interest ceilings are removcd or raked,
or an exception is created. Just such a development allowed the institution of small
loan companies. CuRRAN, supra note 54, at 2. See also warren, Regulation of Finance
Charges sn Retail Installment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 859 (1959), who develops the thesis
that there should be no legal distinction drawn between "loans" and "credit."
58. See Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 95.
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they may cause unjustifiable harm either to purchasers or to com-
petitors.59 Purchasers may pay more for the tied package than they
would have for identical untied goods because the complexity intro-
duced by a tie prevents purchasers from properly quantifying their
preferences.0 0 For the competitors, foreclosure by a tying arrangement
goes beyond simple "hard competition" because it leaves the tied
product seller defenseless. Since the tying seller's advantage may derive
from his position in the tying market, the tied product competitor can-
not necessarily recoup sales in the fashion which competition the-
oretically produces-the reduction of the costs of the competitor's own
production to the lowest possible level. Foreclosure through tying is
thus regarded as a competitive tort.61 In the cases that have come before
the Court, the danger of foreclosure has arisen from the possible use of
economic power-or, more accurately, "excess profits"-in the tying
market to subsidize sales in the tied market. When this danger is
indicated by product differentiation or, in the most recent case, -" by
the tying merchant's significant cost advantages in the tying market,
the policy against tie-ins ripens into a single-test per se rule.0 3 Such
59. See id. at 91-99; and, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 88, 44-45 (1962),
The Note on Tie-in Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 86 (1969), was written as a companion to
the present Note. The reader interested in a fuller treatment of anti-trust law as applied
to tie-ins--especially one familiar with the common debunking of the doctrine by
economists-should refer to the prior Note.
The formal requirements of a tie-in are met in the low-income furniture market. The
furniture sold in either the general or LIM stores travels in interstate commerce. The
volume of the business of LIM retailers exceeds the de nminimis "not insubstantial
amount" requirement. Compare F.T.C., supra note 6, at ix, with Tie-in Doctrine 86 n2,
and United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) ($60,000 per year not insubstantial).
Two separate products are involved. Both long-term credit and furniture are sold
separately a majority of the time. See F.T.C. supra note 6, at ix; J. Chapman, Role of
Consumer Finance Companies in a Credit Economy, in TnE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY
1, 8, table 2 (J. Chapman & R. Shay eds. 1967). They have no more functional connectlons
than other subjects of illegal tying arrangements. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 393 (1949). Separate charges are made even when the products are
sold together. Both buyers and sellers regard them separately, and in low-income markets
both may regard credit as the sine qua non of the transaction. See Note, Consumer
Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 750 & nn.28-29 and citations therein (1967).
"Several of the retailers indicated that, if they were forced to make a choice, they would
rather give up their merchandising business than their credit business, These were
retailers with large amounts involved in conditional sales contracts--some more than a
half million dollars. Furniture and appliance retailers with adequate capital have entered
into a dual-role organization-that of merchant and financier." N. NYnROTrV, CaRIT
PRACTICES OF RErAILERS AND FINANCERS OF FURNITURE AND HohM APPLIANCES IN Two
NORTHWmFr CrrmS 77 (1963). See also note 48 supra. Since the credit tie-in functions
as a tie-in, pp. 269-70 infra, it should be regarded as involving separate products, See
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. 394 U.S. 495, 498, 507 (1969),
60. Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 91-92.
61. Id. at 92-99.
62. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
63. Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 94-101.
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indications of market power are alone sufficient to make the practice
illegal.
The credit/furniture tie-in of the low-income market retailer may
fall within the existing per se rule which bars a tying arrangement
where there exists market power over the tying product. The various
low-income market retailers in any one area may have oligopolistic con-
trol over high-risk credit.0 4 This will be the case where there are a
limited number of such sellers and little effective competition from
other sources of high-risk credit. 5
But while the application of such market power may well cause harm
in the credit/furniture tie-in situation, the threat of oligopolistic sub-
sidization of furniture competition is dearly less serious than the eco-
nomic distortion which has been described in the previous section of this
Note and which is produced even in the absence of market power.cO
The market power test does not rest on its own bottom-it is not the
fact of possession of power that is disapproved, but consequences as-
sociated with that power. One should always be able to expand such
a per se rule to effect its purposes: prevention of foreclosure of com-
petitors and harm to purchasers.
The underlying competitive evils that led to the policy against tie-
ins are present in the LIM retailer's charge-shifting tie-in. The pur-
chaser harm rationale is invocable here: the complexity introduced by
the combination of tying and charge shifting is likely to lead to unwise
decisions by purchasers. And the practice of the LIM retailer is used
against those groups least able to tolerate increased complexity-
segregated low-income consumers. Foreclosure of the tying product
competitor-the general market furniture retailer-is also a danger.
From the viewpoint of the general retailer, the existence of a segregated
low-income market means that a large group of potential buyers are
64. Id. at 99-100. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 520 (1969).
65. Though entry into the low-income market is probably relatively open, the sze
of the market in some dties may be so small as to allow oligopolistic control. Washington,
D.C.'s 18 large LIM furniture retailers, F.T.C., supra note 6 at 4-5, probably is dose to
an upper limit on the number of LIM competitors, yet may itself give risc to the per-
ceived interdependency that defines oligopoly. See also note 37 jupra.
Seventy per cent of the customers of LIM merchants in the F.T.C. study listed no
credit references other than low-income market tying merchants. F.T.C., supra note 6.
at 42-43. Where state law sets restrictive usury rates that only LIM retailers can acape,
see p. 277 infra, lack of general market competition is almost certain to help kolate
those consumers with the highest risk complexion.
The "market power" need apply to only a portion of the buyers in the market. Tie-in
Doctrine, supra note 57, at 97.
66. See Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 95.
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effectively denied him. Inasmuch as charge shifting intensifies and per-
petuates segregation, it penalizes the general market retailer for failure
to enter a new industry (the provision of high-risk credit) and increases
the cost to him of effectively competing for sales on the basis of the
price and quality of his furniture.
The current per se rule against tie-ins grew from judicial recognition
that tie-ins based on market power might produce just this kind of
harm, and from the failure of economists to convince the Supreme
Court that tie-ins offer any significant benefits. Where the tie-in plus
charge shift of the LIM retailer presents the same dangers as the
market power tie-in and is equally lacking in legitimate compensatory
benefits, such a tie-in ought to be held illegal.
The Supreme Court has recently noted that a tie-in not involving
market power may be illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade.07
The development of the market-power rule establishes that once sub-
stantial harm to purchasers and foreclosure of competitors are present,
the absence of criminal intent is irrelevant and any possible beneficial
effects of the tie lead at most to narrow exceptions to a broad prohibi-
tion. 8 Actual proof of damage to purchasers and competitors as sug-
gested herein should therefore be dispositive of the issue of legality.
Our preceding analysis has shown the presence of the tie-in danger,
and the only "legitimate business purpose" which has been suggested
for charge shifting is the avoidance of usury laws. There are serious
questions whether a court may consider usury avoidance as a "legit-
imate business purpose." 69 But even if this is appropriate, presence of
"legitimate business purpose" does not alone justify a tie-in.70 The
court may at most consider the proven benefits of usury avoidance in a
given instance-as where the usury laws seem stable and unavoidable
by other means71-as creating at most a specific, narrow exception to
the general policy against production of consumer and competitor
harm.72
The same considerations which led to the market power standards
for predicting foreclosure may lead here beyond a finding of an un-
reasonable restraint of trade to an extended per se rule. The com-
67, See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499-500
(1969).
68. Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 95-96, 101.
69. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958).
70. See Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 86, 95 nA6, 101.
71. See 1,. 277 inlra.
72. Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 37, at 95-96, 101.
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plexity of economic fact finding in a situation like this one creates a
considerable danger that a multi-factor inquiry into actual damage to
consumers and competitors will lead only to uncertainty. Uncertainty,
especially while under pressure to reach some result, is likely to lead to
confused and irrational decision making.73 Since a charge-shifting tie-in
is unlikely to be of any legitimate benefit,74 we should be willing to
form a new per se rule based on more simple facts strongly predictive
of harm to purchasers or to competitors: i.e., actual charge-shifting
should be illegal per se.
But we may wish to extend our new per se rule still further, because
attempted proof of actual charge shifting may still leave a large area
of uncertainty. If we must determine whether a given seller's credit is
underpriced the difficulty of allocating different costs between credit
and furniture remains. Without endangering beneficial practices, we
could extend our per se rule to all of those situations in which the
tying merchant is able to achieve dangerous charge shifting.75 The fol-
lowing set of conditions would delineate these illegal situations: (1)
the purchasers are consumers or other small-unit or unsophisticated
buyers;76 (2) the price of at least one of the tied products is quoted
individually;77 (5) both products form a substantial element of cost in
the production of the package;78 (4) neither product is sold individually
in sufficient volume to insure that the stated price reflects the seller's
full costs and a reasonable profit.70
73. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 Hazv. L. REv. 226, 227-28, 241-44, 271-75 (1960); Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the
Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 Micu. L. R-v. 925, 3S0-2
(1968).
74. But see p. 270 supra.
75. This would then follow the development of the market power rules. See Tic-in
Doctrine, supra note 37, at 95-96, 99-100.
76. Large-unit commercial buyers have the resources, the economics of scale and
the expertise to pierce all but the most deceptive of sales practices. The "consumer,"
however, is almost defined by his inability to make sophisticated purchasing decisions.
T. ScrrovsKy, IVELFAR AND COMPEm=ON 17-18, 398-406 (1951).
77. Package deals which contain a substantial "free" element implicitly quote the
price of that element as zero, and thus may be prohibited. A seller could lcgally sell a
package of two separate products at a single package price. Since the law requires a
separate statement of the credit charge, however, the LIM[ retailer will not be able to
avoid per se illegality by offering only a package price.
78. If one of two products comprises so minor an addition to the package that the
buyer is unswayed by its having a low stated price, substantial harm is unlikely. The
seller may thus provide "free" services to accompany his consumer product if they do
not represent a substantial cost in comparison to the product.
79. These four criteria do not require the prohibition of all tie-ins of consumer
products. The fourth point preserves the legality of the credit/furniture tie-in in the
general market because the volume of cash sales precludes the arbitrary increame in
furniture price. See pp. 256,262 and note 24 supra.
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V.
Once a violation of the Sherman Act has been shown, Section 4 of
the Clayton Act provides a comprehensive right to treble damages to
any person who is thereby "damaged in his business or property."80
The consumer is clearly entitled to recover in this case, since either of
the two grounds for holding tie-ins illegal will have caused him sub-
stantial damage. As the purchaser he will have been led to pay an
enhanced price. In addition, foreclosure of the general market retailer
will have produced a segregated market in which the consumer's vulner-
ability to a wide range of marketing abuses is aggravated and in which
he is exposed to price discrimination. It is impossible to measure
precisely the amount of damages due to consumers. As a theoretical
matter, there is no factual pattern that exactly duplicates the low-
income market in all respects but charge shifting. The tying merchants'
own actions preclude such an unrestrained market which would serve
as a base for comparing the detriment caused by the tie-in plus charge
shift. But this difficulty is characteristic of antitrust litigation, and
courts have been, quite rightly, unwilling to allow the actions of de-
fendants to bar damages as "uncertain."' Although no tie-in case has
ever reached the question of damages to purchasers, 82 the standard
defined for purchaser damages in price fixing cases is applicable here.
Purchaser damages equal the difference between the restricted pur-
chase price and "the market... price.., under natural conditions." 83
In the absence of an unrestrained market, the "reasonable price"
serves as a standard for comparison.84
The consumer plaintiffs in our charge shifting case will assert as a
certain and easily ascertainable measure of damages the difference be-
tveen the furniture price paid to the low-income market retailer and
the price charged in the general market stores.8- 5 The tying merchants
80. See note 106 infra.
81. While there remain unrestrained markets for comparlson-the untied furniture
and high-risk credit markets--the defendant's actions may have obscured the extent to
which the poor would have used such markets and the price of credit to very poor con.
sumers. A series of Supreme Court decisions reacted to a number of lower court dismis-
sals of damages as "uncertain" by asserting the traditional principles that defendants'
own wrongdoing should not shield him from damages, and t at damaes need only be
based on the best possible evidence. The court has therefore allowed juries great freedom
in weighing the arguments of the parties as to damages. See Bigelow v. RKO Pictures,
327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co,, 282 U.S.
555, 562-63 (1931). Compare McConpwici, DAMAGES 100-04 (1935).
82. But see note 85 infra.
83. Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 3o90, 396 (1906).
84. See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf. Thomsen v. Cayser, 245
U.S. 66 (1917).
85. The only reported tie-in decisions concerning purchaser damages assumed that
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would of course be free to argue that the consumers were damaged to
an extent less than the full amount of the price differential between
LIM stores and those of the general retailer. They might argue that,
without charge shifting, consumers would have paid more for credit;
or that some consumers would have bought in a high-priced segregated
market even absent the foreclosure effects of the tie-in;"0 or that interest
maximum laws would have prevented them from getting credit and
furniture at all. 7 But these are issues for the jury in determining the
amount of damages.
In addition to defining the measure of damages, courts in tie-in
cases must form explicit injunctive decrees both to end the illegal
practice and to dissipate its effects.38 The court should require the
untying of credit and furniture, i.e., require the seller to make a good
faith offer to sell untied credit ("loans") for use to purchase furniture
such a difference was both possible and an element of damages. Neither case, however,
involved a holding. See Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566, 570, 575 (4th Cir.
1963); Bascom Laundry Corp. v. Telecain Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 US. 994 (1955). In Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 497 (1969),
the plaintiff alleged damages consisting of the "unreasonably high prices" and the lov,
quality of the tied product. The Supreme Court failed to comment that these damages
were inappropriate, despite its implicit recognition that an important feature of the
tying product was its low cost. 599 U.S. at 504-05. These cases, and cases concerning
other violations, might be seen to suggest that difficulty in computing damages should
be reduced, and antitrust violations therefore deterred, by accepting a standard of
damages that ignores factors which could possibly decrease the main provable element
of plaintiff's damages. See Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Corlick, 1969 TnRAE CAs. 72,S98 (9th Cir.
1969) (measure of damages in price discrimination action the difference between price
to plaintiff and price to others). Many eases have rejected the "passin; on" defense ap-
parently on the same grounds. See Note, The Defense of "Passing On" in Treble DamageSuits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YA.n L.J. 469 (1961). But no such harsh rule seems
necessary here. Placing the burden of proof of mitigating factors on the defendant
ought to be sufLicent.
One recent case has awarded damages resulting to a tied product competitor. Ad-
vance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 1968 TADE CAs. j72,511, at 85,751
(D. Md. 1968).
In the face of substantial, provable elements of damage in our LIM tie-in case, the
trial court could take the case from the jury only a theory that buyers in tie-in cases
necessarily pay for the combined products what they would have paid for separate ones.
But such a theory would have to be based on an asserted inability of the tie-in to
cause consumer irrationality or to foreclose tied product competitors. The fact that the
tie-in "works" as it does negates both assumptions.
86. Since the tie-in itself helps keep low-income consumers in the tegregated market,
it is appropriate to require defendant to show that plaintiffs would have stayed within
the low-income market despite the tie-in. To require plaintiffs to prove they -would have
left would be to allow defendants' own actions to make proof or damages extremely
difficult. Defendant must also show that his furniture prices would have been higher
than those of general stores even without the tie-in. Such facts, largely involving higher
costs, are peculiarly within his knowledge.
87. For the defendant to make such an argument he would have to admit that this
charge shifting was a device to avoid state laws regulating interest rates. Even if the
court were to allow him to make such an argument, the jury would be free to set an
amount on the value of the protection which the legislature declared usury laws to con-
fer on the poor.
88. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 US. 392, 401 (1947).
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from other stores. While he can still sell the credit/furniture package,
the seller must not coerce consumers to take the package rather than
the untied items. The price of the package must therefore equal the
sum of the prices for the two untied goods less any proven economies
of package selling.8 9
Even a tie-in held to be legal in itself-e.g., where only charge
shifting is held illegal-should be enjoined in order to guarantee the
effectiveness of relief. Violators of the antitrust laws have frequently
been enjoined even from legal practices where this was found neces-
sary to "pry open the market" that they have restrained.10 In this case
untying would be useful, first, because it provides a market mechanism
for preventing charge shifting. Since we would require the stated
"credit" price to follow the untied price of "loans," the LIM retailer
will be forced to keep up the price of credit if a significant number
of buyers would purchase underpriced loans.
The untying of credit would also tend to decrease market segrega-
tion. The mere end of charge shifting will not necessarily dissipate
the effects of such charge shifting either upon consumer irrationality
or upon market segregation. After years of the deceptive practice, the
poor may have developed community "knowledge" that the LIM re-
tailer provides "cheap" credit. It may take both time and further
information to reverse that notion and the buying habits it under-
lies.91 Also, as noted above, the low-income market is a system of
cumulative, circular causation. Removal of a cause of segregation will
not remove the other causes of segregation that have been strengthened
by the original abuse. The immediate effect of untying would be to
allow at least some buyers to purchase furniture in the general market
with the use of LIM retailer credit. Untying will make people aware
that they can get credit in one place and use it in another, ending the
illusory distinction between credit and loans. It may act as a check on
various retailer abuses if it makes buyers feel more free to walk away
from the LIM retailer's sales pitch. Ultimately, untying may force the
package price downward as the LIM retailer comes more clearly into
competition with the general retailer.92
89. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-59 (1948). The court
may also require that the retailer advertise and make initial offers to scl the credit untied.
See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 US. 38, 53-54 (1962). Cf. United States v. R. Hoc
& Co., 1955 TADE CAs. 68,125, at 71,006 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (consent judgment),
90. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 53 (1962); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 US. 892, 400 (1947).
91. See note 80 supra.
92. See note 28 supra.
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One difficulty with the untying of "credit" is the limitations im-
posed by states on the granting of "loans." Every state has a general
usury law that sets an interest maximum at an impractically low level
(usually between 6 and 12 per cent).93 Loans to the poor must find
some formal exception to the general usury laws, and the only one
generally available (other than a retail installment contract) is that
provided by small loan company acts.0 4 Most state statutes do not in
terms prevent LIM retailers from becoming small loan licensees, nor
do they pose onerous burdens. But the state small loan commission is
generally given discretion in the granting of licenses and may impose
conditions onerous to the LIM retailer.95 It is therefore possible that
legal barriers will prevent the effective untying of credit.
Assuming, however, that the LIM retailer is able to become a small
loan company, permissible terms of the credit may vary between the
"credit" form and the 'loan" form-the small loan act and the retail
installment sales act may put different limits on the rates, term, amount
or security permissible under the "different" forms.00 The poor who
93. CupitAN, supra note 54, at 15-16.
94. See generally id. at 15-83.
95. Though requirements for licensing vary from state to state, it seems likely that
such applications will be accepted in a number of states. The barriers to allowing such
licensing fall under several general headings.
In a few states, requirements for licensing and application fees, N.Y. B.A'rame IAvs
§ 341 (McKinney Supp. 1969), ($1250 Ist year), or for minimum liquid capital, Co .
GEN'L STATS. ANN. § 36-226 (1969); N.Y. BANKING LAW, §§ 341, 345 (McKinney Supp. 1969);
N.J. STATS. ANN. 17:10-5 (Supp. 1969) (all $25,000), may impose an intolerable burden
for the smaller of the tying merchants who would be likely to do a small volume of untied
credit business. The court may have to weigh the burden of the capital and cost re-
quirements against the size and expected volume of the individual defendants and
require only those who can afford it to sell untied credit.
While in some states issuance of small loan licenses apparently follows automatically
upon application and the fulfilling of requirements of good character and finandal
responsibility, CAL. FINANCIAL CODE § 22206 (West 1969), MlAss. ANNo. Lmws, Ch. 140,
§ 97 (1965), most states allow an administrative agency to deny the licensing where it
will not serve the "convenience and advantage' of the community. The administrative
bodies in some states have apparently used this requirement to restrict the number of
small loan companies to one per "community."
Limitations on the conducting of other businesses on the premises of a licensed
small loan company obtain in most states. Usually the administrator either must grant
prior authorization or may subsequently prohibit the conducting of other businesses.
The criterion for allowing other businesses is that the nature of the business be such
that it does not facilitate evasions of the small loan act. The only way in which a retail
sales business might facilitate evasions would be the transferring of interest charges
from credit into furniture. But the federal court's injunction and enforcement are
designed to prevent just that occurrence. Besides, all credit issued in conjunction with
a sale will be in the form of retail credit rather than that of a loan. However, Omo
RFv'D CODE § 1321.16 (1962) is probably an absolute bar on small loan retailers. See also
CONN. GEN'L STATS. 36-236 (1969) (limitation on security); Mwnci. COwriL, LAws ANN.
§ 493.17 (1967).
96. See note 101 infra; CuRutP, supra note 54, at 15-124.
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cannot be served in the "loan" form will continue to be captured by
the LIM retailer.97
Because of the limitations on the practical effectiveness of the un
tying of credit, injunctive relief should include the direct prohibition
of charge shifting.98 The retailer can be left free to choose the rate of
return he will attempt to obtain on the resources he contributes
(capital, entrepreneurship, good will). But the court should require
that the rate of return be the same for resources used in sale of credit
as for those used in sales of furniture.°9 If the LIM retailer's untying
is made ineffective by the application of state usury and small loan
laws the direct prohibition would replace the automatic charge-shift-
ing control of effective untying. Alternative methods of countering
market segregation could be devised, such as a requirement that LIM
retailers give to prospective buyers conspicuous notice of the avail-
ability and rates of small loan companies.
The direct effects of barring charge shifting and untying credit
should be to increase stated credit prices and to decrease furniture
prices. Rationality of buyers should then lead to a decrease in demand
for high-risk credit generally and a decrease in demand for both furni,
ture and credit from the LIM retailer. There should be an increase
in the number of the poor purchasing furniture in the general market,
resulting in a decrease in market segregation. Conceivably there will
be cumulative effects decreasing retailer abuses and price discrimina-
tion.100 A decrease in the real price of furniture from the LIM retailer
is also possible.
In recommending such relief, one must, of course, consider the possi-
ble secondary, aggregate effects of prohibiting charge shifting and ty.
ing. If the long-range effects were to be higher prices or unavailability
97. But such capture will not necessarily allow charge shifting. As long as thc LIM
retailer has a significant number of buyers who do have the alternative of the small
loan market there will be pressure keeping the furniture price low. The court can require
the LIM retailer to hold firm his furniture price independent of the credit arrangement
or risk characteristics of the buyer. Overstating of the furniture price would drive from
the market those buyers free to purchase credit from the small loan company. See note 24
supra.
98. Direct prohibition of charge shifting was not necessary in previous tie-in cases
because untying would indirectly prevent such shifting. See p. 274 supra.
99. There are clearly practical difficulties with such judicial regulation. The thorny
problem of determining a "fair" rate of return is avoided, but problems of allocating
unitary costs to the separate products remains. For example, a portion (but hardly )
of the cost of space must be allocated as a cost of credit. To avoid this difficulty, the court
might adopt the assumption that the cost of credit to the LIM retailer is the same as
its cost to the small loan company, and place on him the burden of proving otherwise.
It seems unlikely that the LIMA retailer's costs are much different from the small loan
company, and the facts proving otherwise are within the control of the LIM retaler.
100. See note 28 supra.
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of credit, we might wish to reconsider the wisdom of litigation or the
legality of the practice. But independent of legal restraints the relief
suggested above should not have detrimental side effects. Standard
marginal analysis would suggest that whatever the effect of the relief
on supply or demand, the market would respond by attaining a new
equilibrium position not greatly differing from the pre-relief position.
Barriers to entry or exit do not seem high here and no other facts are
suggested which would lead to a greater departure from the ideal than
is usual.
Once again, however, the artificial restraints posed by state credit/
loan laws may have undesirable effects. The most serious problem
arises in those states which have allowed charge-shifting as the only
(covert) means to escape restrictive maximum rates of interest. The
laws of these states, which pose maximum rates for both "loans" and
"credit," may result in a cut-off of credit to the very poor once charge-
shifting is eliminated.101 Therefore counsel to the poor, before insti-
tuting such suits, owe it to their client class to consider this problem
very carefully, estimating as best they can how many people will be
denied credit and how likely it is that the resulting crisis will cause a
rapid revision in the maximum rates.102
It is also necessary to consider the possibility that an end to tie-in
plus charge shifting will drive a large number of LIM retailers out of
the credit business altogether. 0 3 So long as small loan companies exist
and are legally able to serve all the poor the problem raised by the
demise of the LIM retailer would probably not be a serious one. While
a sharp cut in the sources of supply may have short-range effects,
neither legal nor economic restraints are likely severely to limit the
flow of new capital into the small loan industry to balance the in-
creased demand for loans.
101. Maximum retail and small loan rates vary widely from state to state. For example,
California, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania
have retail maximums as well as small loan maximums. Connecticut, D.C. and illinois
do not. Whether poor consumers will be deprived of credit in any given state will rc-
quire a more detailed analysis than can be set forth here. See generally Curito, supra
note 54; CCH CoNsmumm CRErr GumE. See also p. 270 supra.
102. "Consumer credit restraint tends to raise the real income of the recipients of
income from dividends and interest, and to lower that of the recipients of income from
the sale of labor services." Abstract of L. Graves, The Effects of Consumer Credit Restraint
on the Distribution of Income (unpublished doctoral thesis, U. Cal., Berkeley, 1963), 24
DISSERTATIoN ABsmAcrs 3586 (Univ. Microf. Order No. 64-2054).
103. The loss of the profits from the practice may drive some sellers out of the
market, but this should increase the volume of their more eficient LIM competitors. But
see Commentary of Senator McIntyre, FTC Report Hearings, supra note 16, at 16-17.
LIM retailers are more likely to be forced out of the untied credit business by interest
maximums on retail credit. See note 101 supra.
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An Exhortatory Appendix: Consumer Treble Damage Actions
Consumer protection advocates have often called for effective ac-
tions for consumer relief in the federal courts.104 But both advocates
and commentators have failed to note the potentially useful treble
damage antitrust action.105 The Sherman Act on its face seems to in-
dicate that a consumer action is possible.106 The one piece of serious
inquiry into the subject 0 7 established on the basis of the legislative
background and history of the Act that consumers were given a rem-
edy. The case law does not foreclose the action, and in fact gives every
indication that it would be favored.108
Antitrust violations involving consumers are likely to injure a
104. See, e.g., Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 788 (1966).
State court procedure has often been criticized as impeding consumer litigation. See, e.g.,
Schrag, Bleak House 1968: a Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 115(1969).
105. See notes 2.3 supra. This note concentrates on treble damages as a remedy,
because it is believed to be the most useful to consumers. To void contracts between the
consumer and the violating seller would, of course, be of great benefit to consumers In
antitrust suits, particularly where the amount of damages is difficult to prove. Recent
suits have requested such relief. Complaint, Contract Buyers Leage V. F & F Investment,
2 CCH Pov. L. REP. § 9611 (N.D. Ili. 1969) (complaint on file Yale Law Library). Hayden
v. Cohen, supra note 4. However, the Supreme Court has not looked favorably on such
relief and has denied it except where otherwise "the judgment of the Court would Itself
be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the Act." Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 US.
516, 521 (1959), Ironically, such a situation would more frequently occur where the plain.
tiffs were co-conspirators rather than purely victims, as consumers usually are. Sec id.
But some consumer situations might give rise to a legitimate claim for voidness of
contract, e.g., where the consumer is trying to avoid a contractual obligation to purchase
the tied product of a tying arrangement. See Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340
F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 820 (1965). See generally A.B.A. SEcrioN Or A"-
Tvusr LAw, ANwrrrusr DEv PozENTrs 1955-1968, at 808 (1968); Wood, Unenforceable
Contracts and other Consequences, in A.B.A. SECnON or AN-rrrnusr LAw, AN A-rsMTuSr
HANDBOOK 567 (1958); Lockhart, Violations of the Anti-Trust Laws as a Defense in Civil
Actions, 31 MNN. L. REv. 507 (1947).
106. See p. 254 supra. In a very early case, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v, City
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), the Supreme Court recognized that a purchaser was injured
"in his property" simply by being led to pay more for a product than it was worth. Id.
at 396. The line between entrepreneurial and consumer purchasers is not always easy to
draw and there seems to be no reason in theory or policy for distinguishing between them.
See, e.g., cases in which governmental units sue as purchasers, note 2 supra: Elsen v.
Carlisle 9- Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (class action on behalf of 3,750,000 private
investors in "odd lots" against brokers for price fixing). See also United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 615 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting). Frequent consumer suits would act
as an effective sanction without loss of the compensatory character of private actions, a
result sometimes feared from extensions of the entrepreneurial action. See Note, 71 YALE
L.J. 280, 295-96 (1961).
107. FoRKoscH, supra note 2. This appears to be the only published work directly
considering the problem of a consumer's right to sue. Several cases and articles do argue
for consumer suits in specific situations, but without considering the problems caused by
the plaintiff's status as consumer. See notes 108, 111 & 124 infra and note 4 supra.
108. FoP, oscH, supra note 2, at 290 n.2, states that no consumer action had been
reported prior to 1941, and the author knew of none since then. Id. 265 n.l. They
are still uncommon. Only a few other consumer antitrust cases have come to the author's
attention. See notes 2, 4 supra and 124 infra, Cf. Bader v. Zurich Gen'l Accident & Liability
Ins. Co., 12 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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large number of persons in amounts too small to justify the cost of
individual litigation, joinder or frequently even rigorous proof of the
amount of individual damages.10 9 Consumer treble damage suits would
require flexible and innovative use of all the procedures the law has
developed to ease multiparty litigation.110 The class action under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) would appear to be the only
practical procedure in consumer suits and should be adequate in most
situations."' Common questions-those of fact or law affecting all
members of the plaintiff class-will predominate over individual ones
because the defendants are more likely to have treated the whole class
similarly than to have devised different tactics for each consumer. Con-
sumer or community organizations could collect assignments donated
by their members'"2 and serve as institutional plaintiffs to bear the
burdens of paying court costs, gathering data, and informing class
members of their rights to participate in any judgment.: 3
109. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 714-15, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724, 738 (1967); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Cm. L. Rsv. 684, 686-88 (1941); Comment, Recovery of Damages in Class Actions, 32
U. Cmr. L. REv. 768, 776 (1965) (suggesting claims under $5000 unlikely to be brought).
110. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 109, at 686.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3):
One or more members of a class may sue . . . as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims ... of the
representative class are typical of the claims ... of the class, and (4) the repre-enta-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class . . . and in
addition ... the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other methods for fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
the members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution ... of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation already commenced by . . .
members of the class; (C) the desirability of undesirability of concentrating the litiga-
tion of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be en-
countered in the management of a class action.
Entrepreneurial and goveramental class actions under the antitrust laus have been
common. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (on behalf of
3,750,000 odd lot stock buyers and sellers); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); City of Chicago v. Allen Bradley Co., 32 F.R.D. 448 (N.D. Ill. 1963). Two cases
have allowed class actions for consumer antitrust suits. Bratcher v. Akron Area Board
of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967); Contract Buyers' League v. F & F Investment, 2
CCH Pov. L. REP. § 9611 (N.D. IIl. 1969).
112. Trade associations are frequent antitrust plaintiffs as assignees of their member.
See, e.g., Louisiana Farmers! Protective Union v. Great AtL & Pac Tea Co., 131 F.2d 419
(8th Cir. 1942). See also Sampliner v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 254 U.S. 233 (1920).
113. The community organization holding assi'.nments of claims could insure adequacy
of representation as required by FE. R. Civ. P. 23(a). It would have a sufficient interest
and sufficient funds to retain competent and experienced counsel. If its assignments
covered multiple fact patterns it would be motivated to give effort to sustain the claim of
various subclasses within the overall plaintiff class. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 560-62 (2d Cir. 1968); Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment Co., 2
CCH Pov. L. Rat. § 9611, at 10,750. Legal services organizations might take such suits.
Though normally precluded from fee-generating suits, they may take suits ivhere the
difficulty of litigation and the uncertainty of rccovery are so high as to make private
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Within the context of the class action and the multiple assign-
ment, the court can use its considerable flexibility in trial procedures11 4
to protect the defendant's rights without making the consumer's rem-
edy impractical. 115 The defendant will have an interest in protection
against strike suits, undeserved bad publicity, and champerty, but the
courts should go no further in limiting plaintiffs' rights than is neces-
sary to avoid actual abuse.116 The policy against champerty, in partic-
ular, must not be applied so as to deny consumers the right to be
informed about the law."17 Business and trade associations have their
own lawyers to safeguard their interests-consumers should have equal
access to factual and legal information from "public service" attorneys.
As long as attorney profiteering"" and raising of spurious claims1
are avoided, defendants should not be allowed to shield themselves
behind their customers' ignorance or lethargy. 120
attorneys unlikely to take the suit. See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform
Deceptive Practices Act, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1101, 1112.
114. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
115. Courts and commentators considering class actions usually invoke these two
policies linked with a third, "the interest of the members of the class in Individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
But in most consumer actions "the stake for individuals may be so small that separate
suits would be impractical," and this last interest is negligible. Judicial Conference of
the United States, Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966).
Devices developed in the entrepreneurial context to protect this interest can be applied
with much less rigor in consumer cases.
It has been suggested that FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), in requiring that "the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum;tances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort," would effectively preclude consumer actions under Rule 23(b)(3). Dole, supra note
118, at 1127. But the individual notice requirement need not be prohibitive. Where sub-
stantial expense of notice is required, the court should hold a preliminary hearing on the
likelihood of plaintiff's success. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
Many consumer suits will involve a class of plaintiffs who are not "reasonably identifiable"
and thus need not be individually notified, or who can be identified only as those persons
living within a limited geographic area (in which case a plaintiff community organization
could deliver notice house-to-house). See also Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment
Co., 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. § 9611, at 10,753-54.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 requires the court's consent to any settlement of a class action,
thus providing a check on the strike suit and removing a motive for inflicting undeserved
bad publicity. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 109, at 720; Loevinger, Private Action
-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTrrusr BuLL. 167, 169-72 (1958); Dole, supra
note 113, at 1104 & n,22.
117. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 109, at 718 n.98; Comment, Recovery ol
Damages in Class Actions, 32 U. CI. L. REV. 768, 781-82 (1965). The assignment has
generally been recognized as a legitimate device for enforcing rights, and not champertous,
See Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 App. Div.2d 564, 568, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1958); California
League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 861
(N.D. Cal. 1959). Both the facts and the law of antitrust violations are likely to be little
known to consumers, unlike entrepreneurs who have greater access to both.
118. Attorney profiteering will be controlled by the court's ability to set the fees the
attorney receives from non-joined class members through quantum merult or by 15 U.S.C.§ 15 (1964). See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 109, at 715-17.
119. See note 116 supra.
120. See Kaplen, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAsv. L. REv. 356, 398 (1967).
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Problems of proof -will raise the same kinds of conflicts between
defendants' rights and the practicality of enforcement. As to "common
questions" affecting the plaintiff class as a whole-such proof of an
antitrust violation-consumers can be expected to bear the same bur-
den as entrepreneurial plaintiffs. But a requirement of great rigor in
proof of individual questions-such as amount of purchases by each
particular plaintiff-would often make enforcement extremely difficult
without significant gains in due process for defendants.' Given tie
large number of class members and the small size of their individual
claims, an improved estimate of plaintiff A's purchases affects only a
minute fraction of the total award and inaccuracies increasing re-
covery would likely be set off by inaccuracies decreasing it.12 Trial
time is better spent on assuring the most accurate possible determina-
tion of common questions such as the market effect of the antitrust
violation. These questions affect the entire award, and since there are
few of them, they are unlikely to balance each other out.
Use of the class action helps make the consumer treble damage
action a quasi-public tool of antitrust enforcement and not merely a
means for the most sophisticated consumers to gather damages. It
might also serve as an effective organizing device. Much as civil rights
suits often provided a nucleus around which black organizing could
develop, the antitrust action could be a means for bringing the con-
suming public together against corporate crime.123
In order to avoid burdensome proof that a given restraint of trade
is "unreasonable," practical treble damages litigation must usually al-
lege violation of per se antitrust rules.124 Definitions of per se offenses,
121. Several cases brought by entrepreneur classes have required individual proof of
damages. E.g., Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Af. & Pac. Tea Co., 131 F.2d
419, 423 (8th Cir. 1942). But smaller individual damages, lesser mariation between indi-
viduals and lack of business records make such a requirement in a consumer Suit less
desirable.
122. The very large number of individuals would tend to ensure randomne. The
procedure followed in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 200 F.2d 561, 589 (10th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963), would seem especially useful in consumer
actions. In that case the jury determined damages to defendant's competitors as a function
of the units they sold, and a special referee was appointed to apply the jury's formula
to the volume of business each non-joined class member could prove. Sec Kalven &
Rosenfield, supra note 109, at 693-95.
123. "Any form of consumer protection policed only by the government will suggest
to low-income consumers that their problems are for the government to solve. Giving
consumers a policing role will increase their motivation for both personal shopping habits
and community action techniques." Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE
LJ. 745, 788 (1967).
124. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), on the difficulties of
proof under the "rule of reason." The only aspect of consumer antitrust to receive exten-
sive discussion has been the effort to make refusals to sell houses to Blacks fall within
the per se prohibition on group boycotts. See Bratcher v. Akron Area Board of Realtors,
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perhaps even more than most legal definitions, grow out of judicial
experience with the factual patterns presented by litigants.125 An in.
crease in the number and variety of antitrust suits brought by con.
sumers may therefore lead to new per se categories specifically designed
to protect the buying public. The preceding Note has proposed one
such per se rule as an expansion upon the current prohibition on
some tie-ins. In the meantime, however, consumer litigants will have
to choose grievances which fit within the established per se rules.12
Private suits based on violations of the rules against price fixing and
agreements not to compete may be the most financially rewarding
since such violations are apparently commonplace1 27 and since in both
areas the application of antitrust law to consumer-retailer dealings is
381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). Cf. Contract Buyer's League v. F & F Investment
Co. 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 9611 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 28, 1969), subsequent opinion at 00 F.
Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (price fixing of Negro homes in segregated market, class action
maintainable); United States v. Mortgage Conference of New York, 1948.49 TRADE CAS.
62,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (refusal to lend, consent decree). N. DoisEN, FaoNTrsas ov CIVl.
LBERTIES 377-92 (1968); Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. oF Cnl, L.
REv. 171, 209-14 (1951); Comment, Application of the Sherman Act to Housing Segrega-
tion, 63 YALE L.J. 1124 (1954). Both the cases and the commentaries suggest that the group
conspiring to boycott black home-buyers is the real estate community. However, it may
be that the conspiracy should be more properly conceived of as the majority of whites,
The defendants sued could, of course, remain the real estate community. Cf. S. Palmer,
The Role of the Real Estate Agent in the Structuring of Residential Areas: A Study In
Social Control (Unpublished Ph.D, dissertation, Yale University 1955) (University Micro.
film order # 65-7526); E.V. Prentice Machinery Co. v. Associated Plywood Mill1, Inc.,
252 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 356 U.S. 951 (1958); Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1954) (each defendant had an Inde.
pendent business reason for his conduct).
125. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 US. 253, 261 (1963).
126. There are three elements to any treble damage action; an antitrust violation:
damage to the plaintiff; and "direct" causation of the damage by the violation. See E.
TzImERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUsT AcTioNs Sec. 3.03 (1965). Note that only
violations of the Sherman, Clayton and Wilson Antitrust Acts are subject to private suits.
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964); A.B.A. SEcTioN oF ANTRUST LAW, ANTITRUsT DEVELoPMENTS 1955-
1968, at 277-79 (1968). Antitrust violations require an effect on interstate commerce, but
the Supreme Court has held that the Congress has used its full powers over interstate
commerce in the antitrust laws and has been generous in finding such an effect. See
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
If the United States has received a final judgment against a defendant, treble damageg
litigants may use the judgment as prima fade proof of an antitrust violation. 15 US.C.
§ 16 (1964). Plaintiff need prove only damages caused by defendant's violation. And in at
least one consumer case the Justice Department has filed an amicus brief supporting a
consumer class action. Bratcher v. Akron Area Board of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723, 724 (6th
Cir. 1967).
127. Lack of federal enforcement at lower economic levels and continuing cases of price
fixing even at well-policed levels would make one suspect that such agreements do occur
on the retailer level. "Often these [local] restraints, carried out by small concerns without
experienced antitrust counsel, are of a flagrant type which antitrust compliance has
largely removed from national markets." U.S. A'rr'Y GENERAL's NAT'L Comm. To STUDy
THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT 349 (1955). A recent consumer class action has been brought
by Chicago black home owners for fixing prices of home sales to blacks. Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Investment Co., 2 CCH Pov. L. RP. 9611 (N.D. Ill. 1969). In general,
damages would be more simple to prove in price fixing cases than for other per se
violations.
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relatively straighfovard.' - 8 Once "public service" advocates realize
that treble damage actions are not necessarily "businessmen's laws,"
the consuming public may begin to benefit from federal antitrust law.
128. These per se categories have evolved with the direct protection of purchasers
dearly in mind. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YArx LJ. 775, 775-76 (1965). Conspiracies by persons who sell directly
to consumers, such as retailers, dearly have damage to the consumer as their principal
effect and intent. Conspirades at higher economic levels can result in higher prices to
retailers which are passed on to consumers, and consumers should have no less dear an
action in these cases. See Note, The Defense of "Passing On" in Treble Damage Suits
under the Antitrust Laws, 70 YALE .j. 469, 470 (1961). Cf. State Wiholesale Grocers v.
Great Au. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958). To allow defense "indirectness of
injury" to prevent recovery would be an anomalous result. Cases denying recover) because
of indirectness of causation have functioned to prevent excessive liability due to ripple
effects of harm done to some principal victim. Plaintiffs in these cases have been lesors,
stockholders or suppliers of the principal victim. See, e.g., Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres
Corp., 166 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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